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Abstract: In this work we comment some conclusions derived from the analysis of recent
proposals in the field of chaos-based cryptography. These observations remark a number of
major problems detected in some of those schemes under examination. Therefore, this paper is
a list of what to avoid and to pay special attention to when considering chaos as source of new
strategies to conceal and protect information.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The core of digital chaos-based cryptography is the selec-
tion of a good chaotic map for a given encryption scheme.
Actually, the presence of chaos does not guarantee the
security of an encryption algorithm (Kocarev, 2001). A
good digital cryptosystem based on chaos should not be
just the concomitance of a chaotic map and an encryption
architecture, but the result of their synergical association.
Indeed, the quality of a chaotic map for cryptography must
be evaluated not just with considerations on its dynamic
properties, but also with considerations on the needs of
the sustaining encryption architecture. In other words,
from a general point of view it is not possible to design
chaotic cryptosystems satisfying the chaotic-system-free
property (Li, 2003, p. 30) and, as a result, the selection
of a certain encryption scheme demands the selection of a
group of chaotic maps satisfying a certain set of dynamical
properties. Finally, digital chaos-based cryptography is
implemented on computers and thus the problem derived
from finite-precision computation must be evaluated and
conveniently handled during the design stage. This work
illustrates the problems with three elements involved in
the design of digital chaos-based cryptosystems, i.e., the
selection of a chaotic map (Sec. 2), the selection of an
encryption architecture (Sec. 3) and the implementation
of the encryption system (Sec. 4).
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2. PROBLEMS WITH THE SELECTION OF THE
CHAOTIC SYSTEM
Problem 1. Definition of the key leading to non-
chaotic behavior. In some chaos-based cryptosystems
the control parameters of the underlying chaotic systems
are determined by the secret key. If the link between the
secret key and the control parameters is not established
carefully, then it is possible that the underlying chaotic
system evolves in an non-chaotic way, which further erodes
the confusion and diffusion properties required by the
resulting cryptosystem.
The chaotic systems used as base of cryptosystems are
defined in a parametric way such that their dynamics
depends on one or several control parameters. Moreover,
those chaotic systems are dynamical systems which show
a chaotic behavior for certain values of the associated con-
trol parameter(s). Therefore, the design of a cryptosystem
based on any of those dynamical systems must be done by
guaranteeing the use of the set of values for the control
parameter(s) leading to chaos. Otherwise, the underly-
ing dynamical system associated to the cryptosystem (or
encryption system) evolves non-chaotically, which implies
the reduction of the level of entropy in the ciphertext (i.e.,
the output of the cryptosystem) and of the influence on the
ciphertext of a change in the plaintext (i.e., the input of
the cryptosystem). This problem is specially relevant when
the design of the cryptosystem is based on a dynamical
system with chaotic behavior only for a set of disjoint
intervals of values of the control parameter(s). This is the
case of the logistic map and the He´non map, which have
been used in (Pareek et al., 2003) and in (Chee and Xu,
2006) respectively without a thoroughly analysis of their
dynamics (Alvarez et al., 2003a; Arroyo et al., 2008b). As a
conclusion, it is highly advisable to use dynamical systems
with chaotic behavior for all the values of the control
parameter(s). That is, robust chaotic systems (Banerjee
et al., 1998) should be used instead of nonrobust ones.
Problem 2. Nonuniform probability distribution fun-
ction. In some chaos-based encryption architectures the
confusion and/or diffusion properties depends on the prob-
ability distribution function of the orbits derived from the
selected chaotic systems. If that distribution is not uniform
and independent of the value(s) of control parameter(s),
then the quality of the diffusion process is reduced.
The iteration of a chaotic map can be used to generate
pseudo-random sequences to encrypt the plaintext. The
encryption procedure could be performed by different
ways, but all of them demand the equiprobability of all the
states contained in the pseudo-random sequences. If this
requirement is not satisfied, then the conditional entropy
of the ciphertext with respect to the plaintext may be large
enough to leak information about relationships between
the output and the input of the target cryptosystem (see
the entropy attack in (Alvarez et al., 2003c)). This effect is
specially significant for image encryption, as pointed out
recently by Li et al. (2007) (see Fig. 5 of their paper).
As a remedy, chaotic maps with a uniform probability
distribution function should be selected as base of this
kind of cryptosystems, being the family of piecewise linear
chaotic maps (Li et al., 2005) a good option.
Problem 3. Return map reconstruction. The cipher-
text of some cryptosystems make it possible to reconstruct
a return map of the underlying chaotic system. If such a
return map is meaningful, then an attacker may be able to
infer the value(s) of the control parameter(s) that govern
the evolution of the chaotic system.
The most direct way to estimate the control parameter(s)
from a chaotic orbit is to plot xn+1 versus xn, which is
actually the chaotic map itself. If this representation shows
a simple function between xn+1 and xn, then it could be
possible to infer the control parameter. In (Skrobek, 2008)
a chosen-ciphertext attack is used to build a discretized
version of the logistic map which further leads to the
estimation of the control parameter. One solution against
this kind of attack is to shuffle/truncate the chaotic orbit
before using it for encryption, which randomizes the plot
of the the return map.
3. PROBLEMS WITH THE ENCRYPTION
ARCHITECTURE
Problem 4. Bad definition of the ciphertexts. A bad
definition of the ciphertext derived from a chaos-based
cryptosystem could allow the estimation of the initial
condition(s) and/or the control parameter(s) of the un-
derlying chaotic system. This problem is present in some
chaos-based cryptosystems whose ciphertext is given by
fragments of orbits, sampled versions of the orbits, or
discretized versions of the orbits of the underlying chaotic
systems.
A N -dimensional discrete-time chaotic map is defined by
the rule of evolution
xn+1 = fλ(xn), (1)
and, as a result, the ciphertext can not be the orbits of
the map since it may allow the estimation of λ from N+1
or a bit more consecutive units of ciphertext (see (Arroyo
et al., 2008c)). If the invariant set of the chaotic map has a
size dependent on the control parameter(s), even sampled
versions of the orbits may allow the estimation of the
control parameter(s). This is the case of the cryptosystems
reported in (Garc´ıa and Jime´nez, 2002; Pisarchik et al.,
2006) and cryptanalyzed in (Alvarez et al., 2003b; Arroyo
et al., 2008d). Finally, the theory of symbolic dynamics
can be used when the ciphertext allows to get the symbolic
sequences of the orbits of a chaotic map (see (Alvarez et al.,
2003a; Arroyo et al., 2008a)).
Problem 5. Efficiency of the cryptosystem depend-
ing on the value of the key. If the encryption and
decryption times depend on the key or a sub-key, then a
timing-attack can be performed to estimate the (sub-)key.
Some encryption architectures perform the transformation
of the plaintext into the ciphertext through several en-
cryption rounds. Additionally, in each encryption round
a chaotic map is iterated n times. Since the encryption
and decryption time has to be constant and independent
of the value of the key, it is not a good practice to select
the number of encryption rounds and n as part of the key.
Otherwise, a timing-attack based on the analysis of the
encryption and decryption time can be used for the partial
estimation of the secret key (see (Arroyo et al., 2008d)),
which is a serious security flaw. Instead, the number of
encryption rounds and the number of iterations of the map
should be public parameters of the cryptosystem.
Problem 6. Faulty derivation of the parameters of
the chaotic system from the key. In some chaos-
based cryptosystems the key is used to derive the values of
the parameters necessary to iterate a chaotic system and
finally encrypt the information. If this mapping implies a
reduction of the key space, i.e., that it is only used a subset
of the possible values of those parameters, then a brute-
force attack on the values of the parameter could be much
less demanding than the one on the secret key.
One important step in the design of a chaos-based cryp-
tosystem is to decide what the key is. One possibility is to
use the control parameter(s) and the initial condition(s)
of the underlying chaotic system(s) as the secret key or
as part of the secret key. Another option is to establish
the values of the control parameter(s) and the initial
condition(s) of the map(s) from the secret key through a
certain function. In this sense, it must be assured that the
image set of that function is the whole set of possible values
of the control parameter(s) and the initial condition(s).
Otherwise, a brute-force attack can be performed on the
reduced space of control parameter(s) and initial condition
values with a lower computational cost than the one on the
key space. A cryptosystem with this problem was intro-
duced in (Pareek et al., 2003) and was later cryptanalyzed
in (Alvarez et al., 2003a).
Problem 7. Encryption procedure equivalent to a
mapping only dependent on the key. If the transfor-
mation of the plaintext into the ciphertext is determined
by a procedure equivalent to a mapping only dependent
on the key, then known/chosen-plaintext attacks may be
performed to reconstruct the transformation procedure.
In some encryption schemes the transformation of the
plaintext into the ciphertext is leading either by a proce-
dure derived using only the key, or by a sampling process
on a sequence of values generated using only the key. In
those situations, it could be possible to estimate either
the key or to make up some function somehow equivalent
to the encryption procedure. For example, if the encryp-
tion procedure consists of searching plaintexts in pseudo-
random sequences generated by iterating a chaotic map,
since the pseudo-random sequence remains unchanged un-
less the key is modified, then it is possible to reconstruct
the pseudo-random sequence through a chosen-plaintext
attack (see (Alvarez et al., 2004a,b)). This problem also
exists in those schemes where the encryption procedure
consists of a permutation-only stage which is fixed unless
the control parameter(s) and initial condition(s) change,
i.e., unless the the secret key is updated (see (Li et al.,
2008b) for a general qualitative analysis of this attack).
As a conclusion, the encryption function that transforms
a unit of plaintext into a unit of ciphertext should depend
on the key and on the whole plaintext.
4. IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS
Problem 8. Non-invertible encryption procedure. The
iteration of the chaotic systems sustaining chaos-based
cryptosystems implies working with real numbers. Since
the implementation of chaos-based cryptosystems is done
with finite precision arithmetic, round-off operations could
lead to a non-invertible encryption procedure.
One critical point when working with dynamical systems
and the analysis of their dynamics is the selection of a right
simulation framework. Indeed, the computer-based analy-
sis of dynamical systems could lead to some conclusions
different from those expected from theory. This divergence
also influences and conditions chaos-based cryptosystems.
Thus, if the characteristics and problems of finite-precision
are not handled properly, then it is possible that the
orbits generated as base of encryption procedure can not
be regenerated exactly during the decryption stage and,
consequently, the original plaintext can not be recovered
even when the key is known. This problem is not only
relevant for fixed-point arithmetic but also for floating-
point one. Indeed, the round-off quantization errors could
lead to the occurrence of a non-invertible function for
encryption and, as a result, the decryption process will be
impossible (see the cryptanalysis work in (Alvarez et al.,
2007; Arroyo et al., 2008b,d; Solak and C¸okal, 2008)).
Problem 9. Dynamical degradation. The implementa-
tion of chaotic systems in finite precision in digital com-
puters leads often to dynamical properties completely
different from the theoretical and expected ones. If this
deviation is not considered during the design of chaos-
based cryptosystems, it could imply a reduction of the
performance and even a compromise of the security of the
resulting cryptosystem.
This problem is closely related to the previous one, al-
though the point of interest moves to degradation of dy-
namical properties of the implemented chaotic system with
respect to the theoretical model. Consequently, the design
of an encryption scheme using a chaotic system must be
done by considering its practical implementation (not only
the theoretical model). In (Alvarez and Li, 2006) some
consequences of the dynamical degradation of a chaotic
map are shown in the context of cryptography, whereas in
(Li et al., 2005) one can find a thorough analysis of the
dynamical degradation of a specific chaotic map and some
ways to overcome this problem.
Problem 10. Lack of details in the description. Ac-
cording to Kerckhoffs’ principle, the security of a cryp-
tosystem can not be based on the secrecy of its encryption
and decryption procedures. Furthermore, the key of any
cryptosystem has to be easy to establish and to exchange,
and the key space must be defined in an explicit and clear
way.
The consecution of security through obscurity is something
to avoid when designing an encryption scheme. All the op-
erations involved in the encryption/decryption procedures
must be verbosely explained, and the secret key must be
clearly specified along with an exact estimation of the size
of the key space. The security of the cryptosystem must
be only related to the difficulty of guessing the key, and it
can not depend on the lack of knowledge about the inner
operating of the encryption and decryption procedures.
Moreover, this lack of details implies a lack of security
because without a careful investigation of the whole cryp-
tography community many security holes might not be
able to distinguished by the designers themselves. Refer
to (Arroyo et al., 2008b) and (Li et al., 2008a) for a pair
of examples.
5. CONCLUSIONS
As a result of all the cryptanalysis work in the field
of chaos-based cryptography, we must conclude that the
design of new strategies of encryption using chaos must
be based on a good background on the theory of dynam-
ical systems. In addition, cryptanalytic knowledge about
previous proposals and the restrictions related to practi-
cal implementations on finite-precision machines must be
carefully studied and handled. A cryptosystem is a chain
composed of many links, whose security is determined by
the weakest link, and cryptanalysis is the art of finding
out the weakest link.
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